My areas of specialisation are the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of action and epistemology. I received my PhD from King’s College London, where my primary supervisor was Professor Matthew Soteriou. I also worked under the supervision of Professor Bill Brewer and Dr Clayton Littlejohn. From 2018 to 2020 I was a post-doctoral fellow at Tel Aviv University, working with Dr Yair Levy on his Taking Action First project. Before all of that, I completed a BA and MA at the University of Leeds. Since completing my post-doctoral fellowship, I have been a senior policy manager at the Department of Health and Social Care. I continue to produce philosophy, but it remains to be seen whether I will return to academia.
I wrote my PhD thesis – entitled How inference isn’t blind – on the nature of inference and how it plays its role in doxastic agency—agency over belief. I am interested in how we can be active with respect to our beliefs and can be responsible for our beliefs accordingly, despite that what we believe is not up to us. A crucial element of my view on these matters is expressed in my paper ‘The role of judgment in doxastic agency‘, which is available in Thought (open access). More complete explorations of my view are now forthcoming in ‘Reasoning and its limits’ (Synthese) and ‘The activity of reasoning: how reasoning can constitute epistemic agency’ (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly). This work has led to engagement in related topics such as self-knowledge (see my ‘Luminosity in the stream of consciousness‘) and embodied cognition (see my ‘Reasoning’s relation to bodily action‘).
More recent work aims to correct our understanding of the relations between agency, control and awareness. I have explored the role of attention and perceptual experience in bodily action. I am also developing an account of the way in which much of our knowledge of our action is both perceptual and non-observational.